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Weston v. Commonwealth-One Year Later
In its May, 1954 issue the William and Mary Review of
Virginia Law carried a case comment entitled "Constitutional
Law-Contempt Proceedings to Punish for Criticism of Judicial
Decision" by G. Duane Holloway.' This comment dealt with
the highly publicized case of Weston v. Commonwealth.2 Because of the continued diversity of opinion over the wisdom of
retaining in the Virginia Code that portion of Section 18-255
relating to contempt of court with reference to past proceedings,
upon which the Weston case was based, it was decided to poll
the Virginia judges as to their personal opinions on the matter.
The background of the case is necessary for an understanding
of the survey. In a sermon delivered on May 18, 1952, in the
Arlington Unitarian Church, the Reverend Ross Allen Weston,
pastor, criticized a recent decision of the Honorable Walter T.
McCarthy, Judge of the Circuit Court of Arlington County. A
Washington newspaper published and circulated Weston's remarks in the Arlington area. Contempt proceedings were brought
and the Circuit Court found Weston guilty of contempt and fined
him $100 and costs. The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed and
dismissed the decision with dicta indicating approval of the
Statute involved in the case.
The pertinent portion of the Statute reads:
The courts and judges may issue attachments for contempt, and punish them summarily, only in the cases following:

(3) Obscene, contemptuous or insulting language addressed to or published of a judge for or in respect of any
act or proceeding had or to be had in such court... 3
A very simple survey sheet entitled "Contempt of Court
With Reference to Past Proceedings" was sent with an explanatory cover letter to eighty Virginia judges. This number in1 2 W.& M.Rev.Va.L. 29 (1954).
2
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195 Va. 175i 77 S.E.2d 405 (1953).
Va. Code §18-255 (1950).

cluded federal judges sitting within Virginia's borders as well as
all of the Virginia state judges. Enclosed with each letter and
survey sheet was a complete copy of Mr. Holloway's case comment mentioned above. In addition a statement by D. W. Woodbridge, Dean of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, was enclosed. This statement was published in the same issue of the
William and Mary Review of Virginia Law as the Holloway
piece and took the form of a counterargument to it.4
After pointing out that Virginia holds a definitely minority
viewpoint on contempt proceedings Mr. Holloway said:
The law in Virginia seems quite liberal when viewed as
it is and not as it appears, because the contempt must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and appeal is permitted
from any order of contempt. Also, it must be shown, when
the criticism concerns a past case, that the statement presents a "clear and present danger to the administration of
justice." There are situations in which the individual's right
to a fair trial may be prejudiced as much because of comments on a past case as by comments on the pending case.
The Supreme Court of Appeals has refused to ignore this
and will not close the door on its power to prevent it.5
Dean Woodbridge's viewpoint is as follows:
...the author of any criticism of a court for a past decision
must act at his peril as to whether or not someone in authority
may think it proper or improper. Courts have the power to
decide and the power to decide includes the power to decide
wrongly. ... To publish what those in authority think is
fair or proper is not freedom of speech but freedom to
praise.6
With these two viewpoints in front of them the Virginia judges
were asked the following question:
In the light of your experience on the Bench do you feel that
that portion of Virginia Code Section 18-255 relating to
past proceedings is:
A2
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(1) a much needed statute?
(2) a relatively, unimportant statute?
(3) an inadvisable statute?
(4) a statute which should be repealed?
Of the eighty judges questioned, twenty-three responded
to the request to fill in and return the questionnaire. However,
three of the twenty-three declined to take part in the survey,
merely acknowledging the request and stating their reasons for
non-participation. That means that twenty out of eighty judges
actually participated in the survey-exactly 25% of the total
group. All of the inferences to be drawn from the results of the
survey must be balanced with this factor in mind.
To the primary question stated above the answers were as
follows:

number of responses
(1) much needed ...................6
..................... . . 6
needed7 ...........................
(2)unimportant .........................................
5
(3)inadvisable .........................................
0
(4)should be repealed ..............................
3
In summation: twelve judges, or 60% of the respondents,
considered the statute desirable, three, or 15%, considered the
statute undesirable, the remainder of the group taking a middle
of the road viewpoint on the issue.
The second question asked was:
Have you ever cited anyone for contempt on the basis of that
portion of the statute relating to past proceedings?
(1) Yes
(2) No
One judge said "Yes"; another said "Yes" and qualified it with
"only one time"; one declined to answer the question, and the
7

The judges formed this answer by striking through the "much" of No. 1.

remaining seventeen said "No." One might conclude that although the majority of the group favored the statute, they
had had little occasion to make use of it, or were reluctant to do
SO.
The third portion of the questionnaire provided space for
general comments. Sixteen of the twenty made use of the space
to express their philosophy concerning the statute. The fourth
portion of the questionnaire provided a check space as to
whether or not permission was given to use the name of the
respondent in connection with his answers to the survey. Seven
declined permission, thirteen granted it.
Judge Abbott (19th Circuit) classified the statute as much
needed and gave pragmatic justification for his viewpoint by
saying:
It's better to have it and not need it than to need it and
not have it. It is a protection to the courts, and so long as
it is an existing statute it will act as a deterrent.
Judge Martin (Corporation Court, Lynchburg) took the
firmest stand in positive support of the statute as being much
needed although he himself has never used it. His comment is
as follows:
To publish that a judge has been paid $5,000 to make
his rulings on admissibilty of evidence in favor of a certain
prisoner or his instructions favorable to the prisoner, whether
the publication occurs in advance of or during or after the
trial of the prisoner is a contempt and the statute should
not be changed.
The right of a citizen to properly criticize judicial decisions or acts is not involved. And freedom of speech or press
is not an unlimited right.
Another judge termed the existence of the statute as "a
power necessary for the proper administration of justice."
Judge Waddell (18th Circuit) after classifying the statute
as falling between (1) and (2) on the questionnaire ("needed"),
goes on to say: "I think the power is one to be sparingly used,-

never in a case of bona fide criticism of the judge's decision,
even though this might involve a suggestion of bias or prejudice."
He concludes his discussion of the statute by pertinently saying:
"..

. such criticism [bona fide] would seem to me no more

scandalous than comment on the judge's education."
Representing the middle group who classified the statute
as relatively unimportant, Judge Paul (U. S. District Court,
Western) said: "... in this day of a growing tendency to intem-

perate abuse of all agencies of Government it should not be
repealed."
Judge H. C. Smith, (Corporation Court, Newport News)
fell in the middle group also. His general comment is quoted in
full:
I am sure no criticism of past proceedings would in any
way affect my judgment in future cases. It is absurd to me
to say that such criticisms would affect the administration
of justice in any way or would influence the Court in his
decisions.
The Supreme Court of Appeals felt otherwise in the Weston case,
for it said:
While such an attack may not affect the particular litigation
which has been terminated, it may very well affect the
course of justice in future litigation and impair, if not destroy, the judicial efficiency of the court or judge subjected
to attack.8
To the above dictum Dean Woodbridge made reply by saying:
Surely judges are made of sterner stuf than that. Can it be
that judges who decide the most important questions of our
time do not have the fortitude and integrity of professional
baseball umpires 9
Of the three judges who felt the statute should be repealed
one said: "I feel that the statute in question is very inadvisable
and it would therefore be best to repeal same."
195 Va. 175. 184, 77 S.E.2d 405, 409 (1953).
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Judge Barksdale (U. S. District Court, Western), who was
another judge in the repeal group, said:
I am in accord with the views expressed so ably by Dean
Woodbridge in the addendum to the previous article in
your Law Review.
Judge Lamb (Chancery Court, Richmond) was the third
judge who definitely favored repeal of the statute as it relates to
past proceedings. Although he has never cited anyone for contempt under the statute he has had experience involving the
statute: "But I sat by designation in King George County in such
a case, the judge concerned having (as he of course should) disqualified himself." From his experiences Judge Lamb made the
following suggestion as to the "proper' method to use in place
of the present method.
My judgment is that the proceeding should not be summary.
In the rare case in which such proceeding is imperatively
demanded it should be like any other criminal libel-heard
by another judge with a jury in a plenary proceeding properly instituted for the purpose.
One is to be cautioned again against making unwarranted
inferences from the above statistics, for they lend themselves to
various speculative interpretations. One can correctly state only
those facts which can be positively proven by the data at hand.
The following facts were established by the survey:
(1) Exactly 25% of the eighty judges questioned chose to
participate in the survey.
(2) The majority of the participants, 60%, considered that
portion of Virginia Code Section 18-255 involved in the
Weston case concerning contempt of court with reference
to past proceedings as being a desirable, needed, or much
needed statute. This means that twelve Virginia judges, or
15% of the total number of eighty, have definitely expressed
themselves as favoring the staute.
(3) A minority of the participants, 15%, felt the statute
should be repealed.

(4) Three Virginia judges, or 3.75% of the total number of
eighty, have definitely expressed themselves as opposing the
statute.
(5) The judges participating in the survey have not made
wide use of contempt proceedings based on the statute.
(6) The majority of Virginia judges, 75%, have not chosen
to take a public stand at this time on the over-all issues involved in the Weston case.
John Lee Darst

